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First, let me thank Prof Marie-Claire Foblets, Dr Prakash Shah and the whole team 
organising RELIGARE for inviting me to speak tonight at one of the top three law 
schools of the country. Well done, Queen Mary! It is also a special delight to thank 
you, Prof Roger Cotterrell, for being our chair tonight and to express my gratitude for 
your generous introduction.  
 
I may be a pluralist, but am not a fan of fuzziness, so I relish the chance to help 
RELIGARE's search for more certainty and respect regarding the manner in which 
we deal with the legal challenges of a multicultural Europe. After the successful kick-
off meeting in Leuven and Brussels on 4 to 5 February 2010, this second project 
seminar is making significant progress in defining the work programmes, and we are 
even beginning to look at first results.  
 
Early developments confirm that the RELIGARE project is not without its own 
ideological difficulties. The exit of a major country team indicates that Europe-wide 
there is still only fuzzy agreement on the project's underlying concepts. We thought 
that Tariq Modood in his public lecture in Leuven had consolidated the agenda,1 
highlighting that law and religion are necessarily linked and that states not only 
cannot avoid considering religion, but have an interest in doing so in an increasingly 
multicultural environment. Europe cannot just disregard religion in all its various 
manifestations in the twenty-first century. Political secularism of necessity links law 
and religion through ties of policy and practice. While radical secularism, the 
absolute, total separation of law and religion is manifestly unreal, as the French 
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should have learnt by now, moderate secularism with genuine efforts at relative 
separation is maybe the way forward. But how does one go about this? Moderate 
secularism, as I shall demonstrate, is not just another fuzzy concept; it is super-
fuzzy. Another problem appears to be that whilst lawyers claim to love certainty, they 
have a tendency to sit in judgment over matters and even pre-judge things they 
know little about, including legal pluralism. Unsurprisingly, that can lead to much 
irritation.  
  
This lecture builds on earlier foundations but attempts to propel us collectively into a 
brighter sky over Europe. I want to fly a kite, but more about that later. Forget that 
ash clouds, the effects of terrorism and intolerance of various kinds pose major 
threats to our well-being today. Since law, culture and religion as co-existing and 
competing entities have to be combined everywhere into new forms of "living law", 
that old and still very useful concept,2 there is constant need for compromise, and 
questions on the boundaries of secularism arise everywhere. The case collections 
that RELIGARE promises to provide will document the compromises that have 
already been attempted, or may have failed, and this material will offer important 
indications for future directions. 
 
The fuzzy title chosen for this talk is designed to reflect that the underlying plurality of 
post-migration Europe, referred to as "super-diversity" for Britain,3 forces us to 
reconsider whether our existing categories and legal frameworks are useful, or 
whether we need new terms, concepts and methods to handle the growing 
diversities around us today. We need to think in more depth about the risks of 
combining law with religion and culture at the beginning of the twenty-first century, 
despite predictions of the death of God and the disappearance of religion as a legal 
entity. None of that happened, as far as we know.4 If radical anti-religious secularism 
is not a feasible option, and erecting walls of separation around "law" and "religion" 
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is not possible because everything is interlinked and fuzzy, these negotiable 
boundaries will simply be crossed in many ways, no matter how many obstacles and 
barbed wire regulatory systems of various kinds we may seek to invent. Welcome to 
borderland studies, a truly exciting interdisciplinary field of pluralist exploration. 
 
The resulting fuzziness gives rise to complex litigation, much academic debate, and 
even wars. My basic message is a rather positive one, though. Growing awareness 
that we cannot avoid the challenges of plurality and pluralism (and it does not seem 
to matter whether we use either term) implies that we are already doing well in 
opening our eyes to the challenges before us. Lawyers are presently revising their 
judgments about plurality and have begun to notice a growing gap between legal 
theory and legal practice in a variety of fields related to "globalisation".5 RELIGARE 
is a flagship project in this respect that may prove to be a life-saving exercise.  
 
I first discuss the reasons that law, religion and secularism are all fuzzy and 
constantly challenge us to navigate porous boundaries. The internal plurality of every 
major concept dealt with here is now presentable as a refined pluralism model built 
on the notion of "pop": simply "plurality of pluralities".6 Instead of presenting an 
irritating cacophony of voices, I shall attempt to deliver a kind of "pop concert" with 
some harmonious sounds. The orchestra of pluralism will be heard more clearly as I 
speak. I also have a rather hopeful sub-title for this lecture, but shall hold back on 
that for the moment.  
 
Part II 
So, where does one begin in this fuzzy talk? The title asserts that law itself is fuzzy, 
by which I indicate firmly that legal pluralism is a fact, whether we like it or not. So 
here is a picture of the plurality of laws from my "blue bible",7 and I beg indulgence of 
those who have seen this before. The trouble is, even though this image has been in 
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the public domain since 2006, many people, including myself, have not bothered to 
study this carefully enough and remain unclear particularly regarding the practical 
implications of the messages from this visual representation. 
  
This model builds on earlier legal pluralism studies. Merry's important work was 
certainly not the first.8 The phenomenon itself is apparently ancient: I published 
recently a study on legal pluralism in Vedic India.9 John Griffiths asserted famously 
in 1986 that legal centralism is a myth and legal pluralism is a fact.10 Prof Chiba from 
Japan repeatedly highlighted the interconnected nature of law,11 and many others 
followed. But repeating the mantras of pluralism should not mean that we can sit 
back now and think we have found nirvana. The challenges have only just begun. 
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Essays (Shinzansha International Tokyo 2002). 
 




Good legal theory needs to prove its worth in reality. So what are the practical 
implications of pluralist models? How fuzzy can all of this become before it sinks into 
a nihilist free-for-all, as we are constantly told? There appears to be growing 
consensus now that legal theorising in pluralism studies has reached a state not of 
perfection, but rather of saturation. The urgent need now is to consider practical 
methods of handling the fuzziness of law, to understand better why and how choices 
are made from the register of what I term "pop" elements, and then to define 
acceptable boundaries. The risk is, however, that such applied research will result in 
a huge collection of descriptive fuzzy sets of conflict scenarios that leave us even 
more confused. So we need to continue to think theory and practice at the same 
time. 
 
Some of course would still like to doubt that legal pluralism is a fact. At an earlier 
conference, Prof Matthias Rohe, a leading member of RELIGARE, argued against 
the notion of legal pluralism, saying that German law could do without the fuzziness 
of pluralist analysis. The German Constitution is an excellent example of positive law 
because, having learnt from history, it assiduously takes account of various values 
and ethics and also accounts for local people's social norms through the strong 
federal system. While that is all correct, this chain of arguments simply confirms 
positivist myopia. If one looks at the world through the perspective of the state, 
corner 2 in the above diagram, as lawyers are systematically trained to do, 
everything else a bit farther away, though still fuzzily connected, can just be kept 
hidden from view so that there appears to be no fuzziness. That doctrinally focused 
positivist lawyers should not really look at the world from any other angles remains of 
course the mantra of mainstream legal education.12  
 
Too bad, I say, for this positivist colonising of the interlinked reality of law belittles the 
presence of the other types of law that positivist theorising actually needs to succeed 
in constructing good law, as Prof Rohe's argument itself admits. Prof Hart also 
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Lösungen: Rechtliche Perspektiven (Herder Freiburg 2001); Rohe M Muslim Minorities and the 
Law in Europe: Chances and Challenges (Global Media Publications New Delhi 2007); Rohe M 
Das islamische Recht: Geschichte und Gegenwart (CH Beck Verlag München 2009).  




sensed that earlier, but finally could not acknowledge those linkages because of his 
positivist mental chains and a good dose of European hubris.13 Today we recognise 
increasingly that even a good state law is not actually just state law when we gaze at 
the full, fuzzy wider picture. Moreover, as Roger Ballard reiterated earlier today, also 
in the Eurozone, many people will take other perspectives than state law and will 
start their choice-making as thinking individuals, not as robot citizens.14 Individuals 
as well as social and religious groups may simply seek to avoid contact with the 
official law altogether because the state is not always a friend; no state law can 
totally control that reluctance to engage. Do we then just say that these other 
perspectives create or constitute a lawless zone, a term we love to use for tribal 
areas in Afghanistan or other parts of the global South? Or are we still claiming that 
non-state law is not really law? There is some intellectual turbulence here, especially 
in the positivistic Eurozone, causing major irritations. 
 
You will notice this repeated flagging up of the Euro-element. This is firstly because 
RELIGARE focuses on Europe. Secondly, I emphasise the dangers of Eurocentric 
hubris, exemplified by Prof Hart, who for many anglophile lawyers all over the world 
remains the god of positivism. Thirdly, I highlight the culture-specific nature of 
European laws with the strong influence of the Enlightenment and accompanying 
control mechanisms devised by positive laws to scupper the earlier domination of 
natural law perspectives and the Christian Church. 
 
But natural law is still with us today, as are gods and churches, and numerous social 
norms and cultures. Law as culture is accepted but culture as law creates 
irritations.15 This appears to defy logic and indicates fuzziness in lawyers' brains. The 
simple triangular picture provided earlier indicates and confirms the global reality of a 
plurality of laws, especially if one changes this model to introduce broken lines: 
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This triangle could be the globe; it could be Europe; it could be a state; it could also 
be our brain because as individuals we may all just be fuzzy triangular creatures who 
constantly struggle to make the right decisions. Law as an entity is not simply fuzzy, 
then; it is a complex multilayered plurality of pluralities, a deep "pop" structure. None 
of the three corners shown above is just a single uniform entity or theory; so another 
deeper level of "pop" structure exists, since all three corners are internally plural. The 
different numbers in the earlier graph further indicate the existing pluralities within 
the law. The clear message is therefore that law is internally plural at various levels 
and is super-diverse or super-fuzzy. It simply cannot avoid being its own other in the 
shape of "religion" or "ethics", social norms, state law and now, as we shall see, also 
international law and human rights. To claim that law is only state law is to play 
Vogel Strauss, as they say in German, burying one's head in the sand like an ostrich, 
because one cannot bear the fuzziness of legal reality. 
 
For the benefit of newcomers to this super-fuzziness of law, or for those recalcitrant 
positivist souls that still need to be converted, I should explain briefly that the 
sequence of numbering in the diagram above was influenced by recognition that the 
cacophony of law is performed primarily in society, which I gave number 1. I then 
gave number 2 to the official law of the state, which has at least two types,16 state-
made laws and state-accepted laws. I then added number 3 for the values attached 
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to corners 1 and 2, relying again on Chiba (1986) who speaks of "legal postulates", 
another fuzzy concept, deliberately hiding that these values could actually be 
religious or secular. So here we have a first glimpse of the boundaries of 
secularism.17  
 
The various numbers in the diagram above are indications of fuzziness, hybrid forms 
like Ehrlich's (1913) "living law", somewhere close to 12 and 13, and so on. It is 
evident that legal pluralism, fuzzy laws and overlapping social and legal identities are 
not only an issue in the UK, or in post-migration Europe, and arise not only in relation 
to Islam. Fuzziness, which Boaventura de Sousa Santos elegantly terms 
"interlegality",18 is a truly global phenomenon and is integral to what Emmanuel 
Melissaris now portrays as "ubiquitous law",19 without really saying anything new. 
 
All this tells us quite descriptively that the global Garden of Eden is now an 
increasingly crowded place in which multiple competitions are being staged, 
inevitably leading to complex conflicts that we had better understand as well as 
possible before they arise, not only after the damage has been done. Significantly, 
the new fashion amongst human rights lawyers of engaging in post-conflict 
reconstruction often avoids debates about legal pluralism and thus remains unable to 
construct adequate solutions. This deficient methodology just appears to make an 
attractive new business out of repairing damage – or call it legal plumbing – after the 
disaster has occurred. It teaches nothing about prevention of disasters or more 
tolerance about choice-making by certain "others" because it studiously ignores 
pluralism. It offers no sustainable solutions for the future, since old paradigms are 
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incongruities and conflicts among them." In a typically subtle comment, Chiba (1989:174) 
disclosed that he reacted to criticism of his efforts to navigate the boundaries of religion and 
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just recycled by almost religious recitation of neatly presented concepts such as 
legal transplants, uniformity and globalising uniformisation.  
 
Since law remains everywhere culture specific and situation specific, however, there 
is simply no passe par tout.20 There might be convergence, but a little bit of plurality 
is still not total uniformity; the picture remains fuzzy. We should have learnt this from 
history, but continue to make the same theoretical mistakes repeatedly. Acceptance 
of legal pluralism and of "pop" in the form of tolerance of religious and social diversity 
remains also practically important, as the latest evidence of ethnic cleansing in 
Kyrgyzstan shows, where that dirty fuzzy word "ethnicity" surfaces again and 
difference is blamed for crazed conflict.  
 
Part III 
Lawyers, politicians and many others have found it rather convenient to criticise 
"religion" and "culture" for the polluting fuzziness of law. Lawyers' tendency to pre-
judge seems here more like a clever distraction, hiding the cluelessness of most 
lawyers about theories of legal pluralism, and covering up chronic myopia. Critical 
comments are pertinent for this lecture. Contrary to mythology in the SOAS boot 
camp of human rights, I am concerned with finding sustainable methods to secure 
human rights, but emphasise the challenges of interculturality, which few human 
rights lawyers – and many others – appear equipped, or even ideologically prepared, 
to accept.  
 
This was demonstrated vividly by the Archbishop of Canterbury's Foundation Lecture 
on 7 February 2008 on "Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious 
Perspective", which appeared to upset many people.21 I receive enough hate mail as 
it is, so I refused to speak to journalists after this lecture because I had said and 
written similar things to the Archbishop at least ten years before his talk.22 Today, 
though, I am prepared to face the music in public, for Marie-Claire and RELIGARE.  
                                                          
20  The internal plurality of international law is increasingly recognised, but appears to create a new 
language rather than linking into existing pluralism studies. See Wagner A and Vijay KB (eds) 
Diversity and Tolerance in Socio-Legal Contexts: Explorations in the Semiotics of Law (Ashgate 
Farnham 2009). 
21  See http://bit.ly/em8ttV [date of use 29 Nov 2010]. 
22  See, for example, Pearl D and Menski W Muslim Family Law 3
rd
 ed (Sweet & Maxwell London 
1998), especially Chp 4 on conflicts of law and the notion of British Muslim law, angrezi shariat.  





What Dr Rowan Williams said on 7 February 2008 was thus highly relevant for us 
here. He spoke of the growing challenge in our society by the presence of 
communities, "which, while no less 'law-abiding' than the rest of the population, 
relate to something other than the British legal system alone". The Archbishop was 
talking in code here about legal pluralism and the fuzziness of law, and he 
mentioned specifically Muslims and Shari'a, while emphasising that this was a much 
wider issue. Without using that dirty word "pluralism", and from his perspective as a 
church leader, he highlighted the rights and position of religious groups within a 
secular state. Talking about law and religion, the Archbishop was flying a kite. We all 
know that this kite was shot down by a volley of heated criticisms that the 
Archbishop, of all people, had overstepped his limits by suggesting that there should 
be a place for Shari'a Law within the English legal system. Actually, he never said 
that in the lecture itself. 
 
Recently, we saw a late counter-volley, another kite being flown above Britain. On 17 
June 2010, a new report was posted by the No Sharia Campaign, a group operating 
under the label "One Law For All", created in December 2008, probably in reaction to 
the Archbishop's speech. The title of this report says it all: "Sharia Law in Britain: A 
threat to one law for all and equal rights". 
 
One can interpret this string of words in various ways. Shari'a Law in Britain is clearly 
a threat to the credibility and plausibility of the One Law for All campaign. So is here 
just another self-interested NGO that cleverly claims to protect the rule of law, 
human rights and, significantly, equal rights? The blurb tells us explicitly that this 
campaign group opposes the existence of all kinds of religious courts. No fuzziness 
here: law is simply state law and we must have one law for all. Private dispute 
settlement is out, no multicultural ADR! Tony Blair asserted exactly the same 
position and then silently created Islamic banking law in the shadow of English law 
after 9/11 to strengthen London's position as a global finance capital. So when it 
helps us, we co-opt Islam.  
 




The official credo remains, however, that the positivist boat cannot be rocked and the 
state must be in total charge of our lives. Frightening stuff; have a close look.23 This 
publication is thin on substance, full of rhetoric and displays militant intolerance 
towards anything religious, demonstrating that there are still many people who have 
neither the will nor the capacity, it appears, to engage deeply in the issues with 
which RELIGARE is concerned. 
 
Now let us see how the Archbishop of Canterbury concluded his speech in February 
2008. Here is a public intellectual at work, a plurality-conscious theorist in the shape 
of a head priest – certainly not a fuzzy mind – rather a mature man with a fuzzy 
beard, very much like Prof Veit Bader, to whom we come in a moment. Clearly, the 
Garden of Eden with its forbidden apples of law is not only accessible to social 
philosophers or law professors. This is what Dr Rowan Williams said at the end: 
 
In conclusion, it seems that if we are to think intelligently about the relations 
between Islam and British law, we need a fair amount of "deconstruction" of 
crude oppositions and mythologies, whether of the nature of sharia or the 
nature of the enlightenment. But as I have hinted, I do not believe this can be 
done without some thinking also about the very nature of law. It is always 
easy to take refuge in some sort of positivism; and what I have called legal 
universalism, when divorced from a serious theoretical (and, I would argue, 
religious) underpinning, can turn into a positivism as sterile as any other 
variety. If the paradoxical idea, which I have sketched is true – that universal 
law and universal right are a way of recognising what is least fathomable and 
controllable in the human subject – theology still waits for us around the 
corner of these debates, however hard our culture may try to keep it out. 
And, as you can imagine, I am not going to complain about that. 
 
This recommends the deconstruction of law and challenges positivism and legal 
universalism. It almost says that we should respect fuzziness. This tongue-in-cheek 
comment by a religious leader is a gust of wind to shake the kites of state-centric 
legal positivism. Of course, this gravely irritated the militant ideologists of 
uniformising secularism. It was designed to do just that, since the speech mainly 
criticised intolerance of religion and emphasised the important place of religion and 
ethics in today's world, which is dominated by a definite predilection for secularism 
and continued panic about religious diktats. The main message about the continuing 
relevance of religion pleads for recognition that natural law and values, whether 
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religious or secular,24 should continue to be accounted for. Somewhere in the middle 
of the speech, the Archbishop said very clearly and without any verbal fuzziness that 
"this means that we have to think a little harder about the role and rule of law in a 
plural society of overlapping identities". So it appears that this religious man with the 
fuzzy beard is a much better pluralist lawyer than many law professors. 
 
Part IV 
Let us consider the Archbishop's speech now in the specific context of RELIGARE, 
which aims to provide sustainable policy guidance about the manner in which to 
manage the never-ending diversities of law in today's multi-religious and multicultural 
Eurozone. This promises assistance in the manner in which to navigate the kites of 
legal pluralism that every single state in Europe has to fly now. It is certainly timely 
that Europeans should consider such questions, since we cannot just ban requests 
for minarets or criminalise all people who wish to wear a particular religious dress or 
a specific hairstyle, though that seems to be the trend at present in the Eurozone. 
But do we know enough about kite-flying? I am aware that some of you are waiting 
for my spiel on that; please wait just a little longer. First, to create some focus, let us 
consider this credo of RELIGARE: "RELIGARE starts from the idea of equality and 
how it is challenged by the increasing diversity of religions and other convictions 
that are transforming Europe into a new type of entity". 
 
Assuming that this elegant phrase and specially the highlighted portion comes from 
Marie-Claire, my initial worries about its meaning were calmed, because I know that 
she is plurality conscious and has what SOAS law students now call "fish eyes", the 
ability to capture the whole globe in one's gaze. "Equality" is, however, rather too 
quickly perceived by many lawyers, policy-makers and common people as 
"sameness" or even "the same as me", especially argued by majoritarian people 
without plurality consciousness, those with the blinkered eyes, "fishy eyes" as one of 
my less clever students wrote in an essay earlier this year.  
 
                                                          
24  In combination with other "pop" elements of law, I hasten to add here. We forget all too easily in 
such debates that "society" and "culture" are also legally relevant elements. See the earlier 
references to Cotterrell (n 14 above).  




Lack of sensitivity and respect for the needs of others is becoming really dangerous 
for management processes of religious and cultural diversity in European states. We 
appear to be violating principles of equality in questionable efforts to force unequals 
to become equal, and really to become like us. Is this why we stipulate higher 
minimum marriage ages for certain immigrants or make them pay extra for the 
privilege of coming to Europe while relying on Diceyan dogma? We have simply 
been sliding into harsh and biased, or as Hanne Petersen would say, "graceless", 
approaches to assimilation, integration, accommodation, inclusion and 
criminalisation, if not expulsion, of "the other". States target and criminalise some 
kinds of otherness, but accept new other developments at the same time, with huge 
question marks over the criteria chosen.25 We constantly pre-judge; but what are our 
criteria? Where are the boundaries of reasonableness? The problems have become 
so grave now that more and more activist thinking has emerged, finally bringing 
together theorists, practising lawyers and human rights advocates in this RELIGARE 
project, which is so productive precisely since it creates new opportunities for 
questioning one another's fuzziness. Perhaps we have to be a little fuzzy to get 
involved in this project. That does not mean we have to give up our values, though. 
But we are asked, collectively and individually, for a great deal of tolerance; more 
about that in a moment.  
 
The RELIGARE team, with some healthy reservations about where and how to draw 
various critical boundaries of acceptance, appears to broadly agree now that starting 
from a premise of seeking to protect equality as a core value, the new multicultural 
Europe simply cannot close its eyes to religious and cultural diversity. But within that 
broad acceptance of diversity and difference as a fact, there remains much fuzziness 
of methodology, which Workgroup 1 will have to tackle in the coming months to 
make any significant progress. Do we accept social diversity and multiple identities, 
                                                          
25  Poulter S Ethnicity, Law and Human Rights: The English Experience (Clarendon Press Oxford 
1998), argued in the concluding discussion that English law through its courts was able "to mould 
the law to take account of an increasingly diverse population" (391), but gave convenient 
examples of attitude changes only within majoritarian society. Poulter then provided his not so 
liberal final words on policy, reiterating that "there will inevitably be certain key areas where 
minimum standards, derived from shared core values, must of necessity be maintained, if the 
cohesiveness and unity of English society as a whole is to be preserved intact" (391). More 
recently, similar issues of governance and navigation have been picked up by Osterlund K "Love, 
freedom and governance: Same-sex marriage in Canada" 2009 Social and Legal Studies 18(1) 
93–109. 




but not legal pluralism? And if so, why? Everywhere, so much is clear: we are facing 
contested fuzzy boundaries. 
 
Looking around, though, we realise that RELIGARE is not alone. All over Europe, 
there is growing recognition that religious and cultural dimensions cannot be neatly 
segregated from law. Sweden, of all places, funded its own ten-year project at 
Uppsala Universitet for 2008 to 2018, titled "The impact of religion: Challenges for 
society, law and democracy".26 There have been some protests about public money 
being spent on such a backward-looking programme, which encourages young 
scholars to explore boundary studies involving religious and cultural issues. One 
even tried to fail the first PhD student to come out of that project. This indicates that 
the One Law For All campaign is not just a British disease; it is a Euro-phenomenon, 
with many global implications.  
 
Significantly, the Swedes, too, have realised that modernity did not completely 
eradicate religion. The so-called "secular state" remains in fact fuzzily connected to 
certain religious values, in this case Lutheran, as recently seen in the royal wedding, 
which created other storms in a tea cup. Of more relevance to us here than whether 
a future queen should be allowed to marry her fitness trainer is another issue of 
diversity. If more than 20% of your nation's population are what the Dutch call 
allochthones, fuzzy "others" in perpetuity, though this posh term desperately hides 
the dirty words "race" and "ethnicity", the supposedly shared values in a state-centric 
legal system are going to be under challenge. As noted for Britain by the Archbishop 
of Canterbury, it then becomes not so paradoxical that the dominant culture finds it 
difficult to assert itself and that certain allowances will have to be made. But what are 
the boundaries, and what allowances are we prepared to make? 
 
Part V 
Fortunately, I need not explain this here in detail. The familiar key issue is who sets 
the standards and who determines the guiding norms. Roger Ballard's work about 
skilled cultural navigation, in his brilliant introduction to Desh Pardesh,27 helps to 
identify the issue spot on: agency for navigation is actually a fuzzy set. It is neither 
                                                          
26  See http://bit.ly/igLQVE [date of use 29 Nov 2010]. 
27  Ballard R (ed) Desh Pardesh: The South Asian presence in Britain (Hurst London 2007 [1994]). 




fully determined by the state nor by the ethnic majority; there are always many 
diverse responses. Ballard even suggests that the majority may be disadvantaged, 
since certain members of minority communities may become more skilled navigators 
than the monolingual majority. So some polyglot BrAsians, as they are now called,28 
may become top kite flyers and then take over everywhere if the autochthonous 
Europeans are not careful. One already sees this new glocalised cosmopolitanism in 
the city of London, while the informal corporate environment of hawala transactions 
raised enough worries to motivate terrorism-related investigations.29 From this 
perspective, RELIGARE looks more like a self-defence operation of the white-
dominated Eurozone. We realise the danger of losing control of "our" Eurozone, as it 
becomes more and more pluralised. Whether this is reverse colonisation or simply 
glocalisation in borderland territory will be assessed quite differently throughout the 
Eurozone, but it is undeniable that such fears exist and are apparently growing. 
 
Part VI 
By now, then, several things have become crystal clear. Firstly, law is fuzzy and 
internally plural, with several levels of "pop" plurality within it. It is simply a matter of 
common sense and realism to accept that. Those who do not subscribe to such a 
vision can still leave RELIGARE, and their funds will then be allotted to others. 
Secondly, and equally clearly, "religion" is also an internally plural phenomenon with 
many "pop" elements. We need not discuss this here. Thirdly, secularism must then 
also be a fuzzy concept. Hence, any talk about the boundaries of secularism 
becomes irritating noise not only for people who do not like pluralist fuzziness, but 
also for those who wish to ban religion from the sphere of law.  
 
What is also crystal clear by now, however, is that "law", "religion" and "secularism" 
as concepts and global phenomena are all intrinsically linked through the basic 
principle of interconnectedness, which looks to me rather like karma, the basic 
principle of action and reaction. We should not just think about the familiar Buddhist 
bank balance; let us go deeper to the roots of this concept. It implies that as 
individuals we are not really a law to ourselves, can simply live our own religion, or 
                                                          
28  Ali N, Kalra VS and Sayyid S (eds) A Postcolonial People: South Asians in Britain (Hurst London 
2006). 
29  Access details from the Centre for Applied South Asian Studies under http://bit.ly/ehg8yP [date of 
use 29 Nov 2010] operated by Dr Roger Ballard. 




cultivate some absolutely autonomous secular conviction, as Marie-Claire would call 
it. Individual idiosyncratic lives are inevitably, visibly and invisibly, linked to social 
groups, states, global humanity, really everything. These entities are all semi-
autonomous, Sally Falk Moore would say.30 So, life itself is fuzzy. We know that we 
play a number of roles as individuals, members of social groups, citizens, and global 
kite flyers. And in all of this we are inevitably wired up and interconnected, as Chiba 
(1986) taught us, through the stringy elastic glue of values and identity postulates, 
whether religious or secular.31 We are culture-specific semi-autonomous individuals 
with much fuzziness. The plurality-conscious handling of such interconnected entities 
lies at the centre of RELIGARE's brief; it forms a core concern of human co-
existence in the twenty-first century. In this postmodern age we realise, maybe 
especially as we grow older, that the concept of the autonomous individual is a good 
idea and is a really brilliant theory, but living law constantly ensnares us in pluralist 
fuzziness. Again, do we now revise our judgments? 
 
Part VII 
How, then, do we define the boundaries of secularism? If law and religion remain 
connected, precisely because law is fuzzy, law is not just state law and is inevitably 
never value-neutral. Thus, the core question becomes: how do we deal today with 
anything "religious" and what do we do with the various claims of secularism to a 
privileged place within this fuzzy discourse? Again, as I shall demonstrate in a 
moment, we love to pre-judge what is religious and what is not and constantly fall 
into traps of our own making.  
 
At this point again, I can be fairly brief because Prof Veit Bader has done us a huge 
favour by contributing his excellent essay on the twelve kinds of secularism, first 
presented for the Leuven meeting and then sent to me recently, clearly a signal that I 
must discuss it tonight.32 The paper is extremely relevant and constitutes hard labour 
in the exploration of the fuzzy boundaries of secularism, but the conclusions are 
                                                          
30  Moore SF Law as Process. An Anthropological Approach ( Routledge and Kegan Paul London 
1978). 
31  See n 10 and 15 above. 
32  I assume that implies permission to refer to it here. See Bader V "Constitutionalizing secularism, 
alternative secularisms, or liberal-democratic constitutionalism? A critical reading of some 
Turkish, ECtHR and Indian Supreme Court cases on 'secularism'" 2010 Utrecht Law Review 6(3) 
9–35. This article forms part of the RELIGARE Additional Materials for 4 to 5 February 2010. 




questionable and actually rather intolerant. There is even a final recommendation to 
throw out the concept of "secularism" altogether because it is too fuzzy and there is 
too much confusion over what this concept means.  
 
I do not think this is a constructive suggestion. Do we then also throw out the 
concept of "law" because it gives rise to problems in our understanding? Expunging 
a concept or term because nobody can make full sense of it strikes me as nihilistic 
abandonment of scholarly responsibility. I suggest we have to live with troublesome 
fuzzy secularism and its threatening implications, just as we have to live with fuzzy 
law and its many unpleasant consequences.  
 
Bader's paper offers, however, notable insights into the lack of comprehension 
displayed by Indian judges of secularism in India. Now, I am not going to launch into 
a lecture on Indian secularism here.33 But let us note that the wonderful ideal of 
Indian secularism as "equidistance of the state from all religions" is neither trusted 
globally, nor fully accepted or understood by many modern Indians themselves, 
those with the colonised minds. This "pop" element is so confusing and muddled that 
several more books will need to be written on it.  
 
Bader stumbles onto something really spicy here, smelling that the Indian state 
actually manages a somewhat soft system of interlinkedness of law and religion, 
different from French-style laicist separation or the US model of non-establishment. 
He senses that while the Indian legal system and its functionaries do not fully 
understand this fuzziness, people are deeply conscious of the notion of "unity in 
diversity".34 For me as a South Asia specialist, this is just another culture-specific 
term for "pop", but even Indian Supreme Court judges, mostly brainwashed by 
positivist Western training, remain deeply confused about such notions. While 
admitting a role for religion in Indian law today is officially seen as unconstitutional, 
                                                          
33  It appears that a detailed analysis would necessitate a whole new piece of research on the 
precise meanings in classical Sanskrit and today's Hindi of a concept that was well-established 
by ancient Indians as seen in Sanskrit references like "dharmanirapekshavāda", translatable as 
"the theory of the impartiality of dharma", and thus maybe "secularism". This term certainly has 
many shades of meaning, including the politically well-known "non-alignment". It is clearly 
another super-fuzzy concept that awaits deeper analysis. 
34  Derrett JDM Religion, Law and the State in India ( Faber & Faber London 1968) discusses such 
notions in detail. 




the world is being led to believe by an unholy alliance of secular scholars and human 
rights activists that the Indians run a fascist Hindu theocracy.  
 
Clearly, something does not add up here, probably because we are prejudging 
again. Yes, there is communal violence in India, but blood flows in Blackburn, Berlin, 
Bratislava and not just in Bombay or Baroda. The Indians have somehow been 
teaching their now almost 1.2 billion citizens – many more than the whole Eurozone 
together – through modern constitutional interventions that remain inadequately 
studied, that the key concept of dharma, the duty to do the right thing at any time of 
your life, is not just a Hindu term, but is a globally valid concept that can be applied 
anywhere. We cringe, of course, and dismiss such deep thinking as fascist hindutva, 
Hindu nationalism. But who are we to pre-judge a culture and a religion without 
studying it properly? When we simply classify and dismiss anything Hindu or Muslim 
as religious,35 for us there is no fuzziness any more; for us, these entities are just 
polluted and deemed backward by association with religion. But they are also living 
realities, and they are fuzzy. 
 
India's constitutional dharma as an unspoken and current interlinking reality, we 
need to realise, binds Indians of all creeds as citizens under the same, secular 
Constitution. These are fuzzily shared common values, it appears. Of course, the 
Indian Constitution does not explicitly mention dharma because the post-
Enlightenment world would just scoff. And by now, the Indians are so ashamed of 
their own culture that they, including their judges, are mentally blocked from clear 
thinking about the boundaries of secularism. Veit Bader's analysis spots all of this, 
smells the spicy masala of dharmic plurality – and then decides to throw it into the 
dustbin of history. What a pity! Are we just afraid of masala? Can we not go deeper 
in our analysis? 
 
                                                          
35  For details, see Menski W "Hindu law as a 'religious' system" in Huxley A (ed) Religion, law and 
Tradition: Comparative Studies in Religious Law (RoutledgeCurzon London 2002) 108–26; 
Menski W Hindu Law: Beyond Tradition and Modernity (Oxford University Press New Delhi 
2003). 




Most common Indians instinctively know that dharma is not just religious or 
"Hindu".36 Rather, it is a civic concept in which the fuzzy boundaries of religion, law 
and secularism are less relevant than the question whether appropriate, situation-
specific and just solutions can be found. Where situation-specific justice is the 
ultimate goal, the boundaries of equality and difference become contested, and 
equity has become the not-so-new tool to achieve appropriate balances between 
newly emerging competing equalities.37 Some Indian judges have actually been quite 
explicit about this, but an increasingly globalisation-focused audience has not taken 
this seriously.38 We in the West have not picked up those sounds, nor do we wish to 
pick them up, because the underlying message amounts to a rejection of the colonial 
legal order, also of simplistic transplant ideology. The advice has been that careful 
sifting of Euro-values is needed also in post-colonial India to create a culture-specific 
new legal order, which would necessarily be fuzzy and internally diverse. We may 
realise that this sounds not unlike the challenges faced by post-migration Europe. 
 
We simply do not realise that the Indian state has since 1947 gradually prevailed on 
all citizens, Hindus, Muslims, and all others, to bring themselves within the so-called 
basic structure of the Indian Constitution, but without mentioning dharma. Nobody 
knows where the fuzzy boundaries of this basic structure exactly are, but definitional 
criteria relate to situation-specific justice and constant dynamic processes of fine-
tuning. All we are told to see is that association with Hinduism pollutes dharma; so 
we still fear religious diktats by men in orange clothes and long beards. Yes, they 
may raise their voices, even in British courts, but RELIGARE wants to develop 
                                                          
36  Probably most Indian Muslims know this, too, and they are similarly aware of the internal 
diversity of Shari'a. I can only reiterate here my statement that "[a] good Muslim is therefore, of 
necessity, a pluralist" (Menski 2006: 281, as n 7), evidently more so in some parts of South Asia 
than in Pakistan or in the Middle East. 
37  On an earlier phase of legal development, see Derrett JDM "Justice, equity and good conscience 
in India" in Derrett JDM (ed) Essays in Classical and Modern Hindu Law Vol 4 (Brill Leiden 1978) 
8–27. An excellent sample of new equity is India's development of the post-Shah Bano 
maintenance regulations for all divorced wives, on which see Menski W "The Uniform Civil Code 
debate in Indian law: New developments and changing agenda" 2008 German Law Journal 9(3) 
211–250. 
38  Chief Justice Bhagwati in MC Mehta v Union of India [1987] 1 Supreme Court Cases 395 420, 
openly proclaimed: "We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would 
adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialised economy. We 
cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in 
England or … in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal 
order. We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to 
build our own jurisprudence." 




methods to handle exactly such irritations. We also need to know more about the 
reasons that certain borderline issues are raised, and the reasons that there are 
some repeat players that appear to manipulate the agenda and our discussions.  
 
Partly infected by contagious fears of such religious fuss, Veit Bader suggests 
expunging secularism and proposes focus on LDC. Clearly, we academics love new 
terms. LDC is not a new category of gender fuzziness, but stands for a potentially 
radical secular entity: Liberal Democratic Constitutionalism. The trouble with this 
concept and its anticipated use is that it appears to ban "religion" from the sphere of 
law and privileges statist positivism as the ultimate arbiter of justice. It separates 
"law" and "religion", and looks like a model; therefore, that is out of date and not 
suitable for countries like India, indeed for the world.  
 
So, for example, Bader observes correctly that LDC appears to mean 
implementation of a Uniform Civil Code in India.39 But I am sorry to tell you that he 
talked to the wrong people. State-centric management in Indian law remains a 
tempting thought for many Indians, but resurrects grave doubts whether we can trust 
the state. When the Indians had a nationalist BJP government a few years ago, they 
actually realised that state-centrism would mean Hinduisation. The BJP itself 
realised that this would be unworkable and would actually be unconstitutional. The 
unspoken basic structure foundation of dharma thus saved India from self-
destruction, precisely because it remains fuzzy about the boundaries of religion and 
secularism. In fact, dharma encompasses both. Fuzziness, this suggests, is more 
practically useful than we realise and care to admit. 
 
Part VIII 
So the question for Europe becomes whether such an intriguingly fuzzy concept can 
be recycled and repackaged for the Eurozone. Suggesting eurodharma as a wonder 
drug for the aches and pains of multicultural Europe will irritate many of you, and I 
am certainly not a Hindu missionary. But this is the envisaged hopeful sub-title for 
my talk. It suggests that with less noisy panic about "religion" and reduced fears 
                                                          
39  A 44 of the Constitution of India, 1950, provides that "[t]he State shall endeavour to secure for 
the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India". What exactly this may have 
meant around 1950 and what it may mean today remains in need of much debate. It certainly did 
not involve the end of personal status laws (see Menski 2008 German Law Journal). 




about religious diktat, we might cultivate clear-headed readiness to listen to the 
harmonising sounds coming out of India about the way in which to manage a whole 
continent on the basis of an unspoken fuzzy Hindu notion, while accommodating 
more than 150 million Muslims, many more than we have in Europe today.  
 
Article 51A of the Indian Constitution does refer to the duty of all citizens to respect 
the country's composite culture.40 Here is another word for fuzzy, a simple and less 
dirty word, "composite". It asks for tolerance and indicates different components. So 
could we compose a new eurodharma and perhaps call it a eurohymn for our 
composite Europe, or for the various composite nations of Europe? Or do we wish to 
persist in claiming that law and culture are not related, that "law" is just a boxed, 
separate entity? The new composition will of course need to include some "dirty" 
elements, such as difference or diversity, but also nicer notions such as democracy 
and decency. Maybe we can even compose a full eurosymphony, given that Esin 
Örücü writes so elegantly about law as an orchestra.41 
 
While fear of religious diktat remains clearly a prominent modernist phobia, this must 
in our postmodern age be put in perspective. My work on Hindu law demonstrates 
clearly that the Hindus would not even know where to look for a religious diktat-
maker, because there is no one god that could act like Napoleon.42 Manu is just an 
old skeleton in the cupboard of Hindu law, certainly not a law-maker. Orientalism 
appears to have constructed a faulty vision, and now Indian colonised minds repeat 
the nonsense, sold in paperback editions of Manu's Code.43 This tells us a great deal 
about the powers of publishers to manipulate worldwide and seriously outdated 
perceptions of Indian law, which hold back a plurality-conscious global analysis.  
 
                                                          
40  Part of the Fundamental Duties under A 51–A in the Indian Constitution of 1950 as amended in 
1976, A 51–A(f) lays down that it shall be the duty of every citizen of India "to value and preserve 
the rich heritage of our composite culture".  
41  Pertinent questions over politics and who would conduct such an orchestra were raised 
immediately after this lecture and it is evident that there is much to debate. On various 
contributions of comparative law, see Örücü E The Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations on a 
Theme for the Twenty-First Century (Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2004). 
42  See Menski "Hindu law as a 'religious' system". 
43  See Doniger W and Smith BK The Laws of Manu (Penguin New Delhi 1991). More recently, 
maintaining such misleading images, see Olivelle P Manu's Code of Law. A Critical Edition and 
Translation of the Manavadharmasastra (Oxford University Press New Delhi 2006). 




The much bigger risk today remains that excessive reliance on state law can 
everywhere quickly be abused, and so can social norms of course, and even the 
sheep's clothes of human rights norms are perceived as "monsters" by many people 
around the globe.44 So we cannot trust anyone; we cannot even trust ourselves. Is 




I wonder if there is some scope for my recent kite model to become relevant for the 
project of RELIGARE and whether lawyers should construct not a eurosymphony, 
but perhaps a eurokite. This new kite structure is currently being fine-tuned and one 
should notice the re-numbering to reflect the historical shift over time from corner 1 
at the top (natural law) towards corner 2 on the right hand side (social norms) to 
corner 3 on the left (the various state laws) and now corner 4 at the bottom (various 




All I did, then, is add a fourth corner to the triangle as shown earlier, now to include 
international law and human rights as another "pop" element in the fuzzy 
superstructure of law. I found in the past two years that this simple image makes 
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instant sense in many parts of the world.45 Imagine a sky full of kites – nice breeze, 
graceful movements – and then there are all those crashes and turbulences that 
cause havoc. Kite-flying is a high-risk activity: but so are law and life. 
 
Some interesting thoughts have emerged recently amongst lawyers about certain 
methods of handling the increasing diversities in our midst and RELIGARE seems to 
create productive synergies. One element is the focused use of equity.46 All over 
Europe, we find examples of that old technique of making strategic exceptions in 
certain situations to avoid hardship and injustice.47 Further, many states are familiar 
with making special rules for certain groups of people, without sliding into the 
Ottoman millet system of personal status laws. We have amazingly clear-cut 
examples of such situation-specific management of diversity from all over the 
Eurozone. Thirdly, and this was also a hidden message in the Archbishop's lecture, 
tolerance of diversity must have limits, indeed. So there is something to be said for 
the concept of "intolerance of intolerance", which Arvind Sharma developed with 
reference to India and the need for Hindus to avoid being deprived of recourse to 
their own values and concepts.48 It is noteworthy that in later publications by the 
same prominent author, this concept appears to have vanished, probably since it 
appeared to many to justify communal violence. But where are the limits of 
tolerance? All over the globe, we struggle with that question. 
 
My final suggestion is, therefore, that we rid ourselves of the modernist blindness 
and colonial tummy aches that we are experiencing especially in Britain and some 
other countries in Europe now when erstwhile colonial subjects use their ethnic 
                                                          
45  See Menski W "Flying kites in a globalizing sky and dodgy weather forecasts: Accommodating 
ethnic minority laws in the UK'" 2009 Journal of Multilingual Multicultural Studies and Practices 2 
26–45 (in Japanese with an English abstract). 
46  See excellently a recent draft working paper from Spain: Bengoetxea J 2010 "Multiculturalism 
and legal pluralism: European perspectives", which suggests lack of co-ordination amongst 
various kinds of lawyers "who must cope with the fragmentation and plural condition of law 
among other rules systems, seeking justice in concrete instances, seeking equitable, fair 
solutions" (1–2). 
47  For England, see Chief Adjudication Officer v Kirpal Kaur Bath [2000] 1 FLR 8 CA and the way in 
which the court of appeal was forced, in order to avoid injustice, to acknowledge the legal validity 
and thus legal effects of an unregistered Sikh religious marriage in London some 40 years 
earlier. See also the unreported mahr case of Ali v Ali in 2000, first discussed in Menski W 
"Immigration and multiculturalism in Britain: New issues in research and policy" 2002 KIAPS: 
Bulletin of Asia-Pacific Studies XII 43–66.  
48  Sharma A Hinduism for our Times (Oxford University Press Delhi 1996).  




implants of "unofficial laws" to claim more formal legal recognition,49 establish 
unofficial Shari'a councils and tactically demand all kinds of things, whether full-
fledged personal laws or open air cremations to avoid alleged distress to Hindu souls 
in the UK, as happened in the recent Ghai case.  
 
Several speakers in the RELIGARE seminars indicate that we should become a little 
more liberal in our democratic constitutionalism and should practise with more 
circumspection what Tariq Modood terms "moderate secularism". It appears that my 
arguments and Modood's suggestions are broadly in line with Bader's ideas about 
LCD, especially when he finally talks about soft liberal democratic constitutionalism, 
realising that, as in India, while the state remains the final arbiter, it should not seek 
to control everything, quite contrary to what the One Law for all Campaign suggests.  
 
We are on to something really productive here, then, contemplating softer forms of 
drawing boundaries rather than supporting aggressive claims and domineering or 
punishing positioning by state legal systems. We should at least consider whether 
the concept of dharma, which like Shari'a is both religious and secular at the same 
time, and is thus super-fuzzy, is not something useful for the whole of Europe, if only 
because speaking of dharma takes away the focus from the current obsession with 
Shari'a. The concept of Euroshari'a would of course please some people, but like 
eurodharma, it would probably be ideologically unacceptable for the Eurozone, and 
thus would be shot down as a kite and made to crash unless we gave it different 
names. But the principle seems valuable and practically useful. Doing what is right, 
for yourself, for your group, for your country, and also for human rights, trying to do 
what is appropriate in any specific scenario of life, sounds like a globally desirable 
element of human existence and thus a solid building-block for the basic structures 
of individual behaviour and good governance. The trouble is that this choir of 
competing voices may all too easily become an irritating noise. The various efforts to 
compose a pleasant symphony will simply run into trouble all the time.  
 
If we can overcome our phobias about recycling tainted terminologies and calm our 
panics about religion, however, filling established terms with new meanings and thus 
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opening and expanding their boundaries rather than simply closing things off and 
pre-judging, this may be a useful way forward. Hence, let us fly more pluralist kites 
that take account of all four "pop" corners, engage in respectful conversations with 
all expressed needs, and then try to find the right balance to sail majestically at the 
right level of the global skies of law. It may sound too idealistic, and those who shout 
loudest will certainly abuse it, but that problem is not very different from what we 
have today. Everywhere on the globe, that fuzzy entity called "law" continues to 
experience difficulties in finding the right balance between competing expectations. If 
the kite model above teaches us anything, it is that all four corners of the kite are 
always present and that none of the four plural voices in this concert could and 
should ever be fully silenced. There is no need for flirting with God, a concept that 
Pascale Fournier has recently thrown into the debate.50 All we need is some 
collective secular ijtihad and respect for the voices of others. The ultimate limits lie in 
assiduously preserving intolerance of intolerance. That, I suggest finally, is another 
super-fuzzy challenge for all of us. One thing is already certain: an increasing 
number of Europeans would see simply blanking out religion and culture from law 
today as a manifestation of intolerance. 
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